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LCSPGI.  Introduction
This paper asks whether or not sex is the primary determinant  of labor force
participation patterns by using panel data to examine patterns of labor force entry among
adult men and women who have different household responsibilities. Labor supply
studies differentiate between men and women based on the assumption  that individuals
are homogeneous by gender (Smith 1983, Psacharopoulos 1994) and that biological
differences and the socially ascribed roles due to them may be important factors in
determining labor force participation patterns, indicating that models of female labor
supply are distinct from those for men (Ashenfelter 1986). This paper suggests that
"gender" alone may be a simplistic division, though, since labor supply behavior may be
more subject to the constraints imposed by household roles rather than by sex, per se. Of
course, gender itself may shape the constraints, but given that they exist, the paper
suggest that an individual's role in the household as breadwinnerl and/or caregiver may
be a better explanation of differential labor force transition patterns than the sex of the
individual.
A second goal of this paper is to identify how households cope with business
cycle fluctuations. When the economy slows down, the potential labor force entrant must
decide if he/ she will enter the labor force and if he/she does, which sector to enter.  The
entry decision is based on the income needs of the household, the level of homecare
required, and the individual's position in the household, i.e. primary breadwinner or
caregiver. If the individual is the primary breadwinner, he/she will enter, regardless of
l In this analysis, observations are selected into the sample if they are not working. Nevertheless, if an
individual describes him or herself as the household head, we assume that he/she plays a role as a
breadwinner or a caregiver. The breadwinner may simply be the person who assures that there is adequate
3his/her gender and associated homecare duties. On the other hand, if the individual is not
the primary breadwinner, during brief periods of economic  need, such as business cycle
downturns, she/he may act as secondary labor and enter the labor force. However, the
need to also perform as caregiver will lead to entry in the more time- and location-
flexible informal sector.
Answers to these two questions will also add to the debate about whether or not
the labor market in Mexico is highly segmented. The informal sector is traditionally
interpreted as an employer of last resort in highly regulated labor markets (Thomas
1992). A competing view suggests that the labor market is well integrated, so if people
enter the informal sector, they may do so in search of flexibility (Maloney 1997,
Cunningham and Maloney 1998). The sectoral allocation patterns detected in the study
will reveal whether individuals always prefer the higher paying formal sector (or self-
employment)  jobs or if they enter the flexible, lower paying informal wage jobs to
simultaneously fulfill market and household roles.
A Mexican household survey that follows individuals over five consecutive
quarters for 1987-1993 is used for the analysis. It offers three advantages over most other
developing country. First, each observation's labor force behavior over time can be
identified, thereby omitting the problem of sample heterogeneity faced in cross-sectional
time series studies. Second, the household survey permits the incorporation of
information about the presence and labor market activity of other household members
over the same period. Finally, the Mexican economy went through a full business cycle
during this period, so labor supply during both peaks and troughs can be considered.
household  income,  although  it may  be received  through  non-labor  instruments  or through  the labor  of other
household  members  who  are not the head  of household.
4Five groups of people who identify either themselves or their spouse as the
household head are analyzed: married women (wives), married men (husbands),
unmarried women with children (single  mothers), unmarried women without children,
and unmarried men.2 Each group represents a mix of the breadwinner  and/or caregiver
roles and is examined in the context of two questions: 1) is household role, rather than
sex, an important force behind labor force entry patterns, and 2) how do entry and
sectoral choice patterns differ for each type of household head over the business cycle?
The paper is structured as follows: Section II describes a simple framework  to
motivate the connection among labor supply, business cycle fluctuations,  and family
structure. Section III describes the sample and the state of the Mexican economy over the
seven year period.  Section IV gives an overview of employment and sectoral allocation
levels and transitions in a peak and a trough period for each type of head. Section V
outlines the methodologies: a logit estimate to understand the decision to participate in
the labor force, and a multinomial logit for sectoral choice decisions. The model
estimates are given in Section VI. Section VII summarizes and concludes.
II.  Analytical Framework
The decision to participate in the labor market is generally modeled as the
individual's maximization of lifetime utility (happiness) subject to budget and time
constraints. If the utility derived from the (marginal) expected wage is higher than that
derived from the (marginal) hour of non-market work, the individual enters the labor
force. In our analysis, all individuals are members of a household, so the form of the
2 Unmarried men could not be disaggregated  into "unmarried fathers" and "unmarried men without
children" categories because  the data do not identify fatherhood. Only motherhood is explicitly identified.
5utility function and budget and time constraints must take into account the contributions
and needs of other household members. 3
The influence  of household composition on the labor supply decision may be
incorporated into the household head's utility function such that when the head optimizes
her/his own utility, the utility of the other household members is also optimized (Mincer
1962). Tasks are assigned such that individuals with a comparative advantage in the
labor market allocate their time to wage earning activities while others care for the
household. 4 Gender was formally incorporated into the theory when Becker (1991)
argued that comparative advantage was determined by the biological differences between
men and women and the gender roles that emerge from these differences. Thus, biology
and society dictate that women should care for the home and men should participate in
the labor market.
The neat division of household and market tasks along gender lines is not always
possible, for two reasons. First, the individual responsible for the economic well-being of
the household may not be able to provide the necessary household income, so individuals
who normally are not in the labor market may be required to enter the labor market.
During economic downturns, we expect to see evidence of labor force entry among non-
workers for two reasons. First, since there is no unemployment insurance in Mexico,
households must insure themselves against unexpected income losses by sending their
members to work when the likelihood ofjob loss or wage reduction increases. Second,
3 For a technical presentation of the theory, see, for example, Khandker 1988.
4 Recently, these theories have been criticized in favor of bargaining  models (Pollack 1994). Most
bargaining  models assume that all members simultaneously  make their market and home labor allocation
decisions based on their own utility function and the expected  behavior of other family members. Recent
work by Haddad, et. al. (1997) in developing countries and by Pradham  and Soest (1997) in urban Bolivia,
suggest that a Mincer/Becker model is still appropriate for developing countries. We will use this model to
6there will be real negative shocks to income during this period through wage cuts 5 or lay-
offs, so those households that do not self-insure  will need to send someone to work,
called an added worker effect (AWE)  .6 If an added worker effect does exist in Mexico
(it has not been clearly detected in developed country's labor markets), the statistics will
show increased labor force entry when a primary breadwinner in the household loses his
or her job.
The sector of entry depends on the needs of the household and the role of the
individual in the context of the household. If there is a fall in household earnings,  the
new worker may need to enter the higher paying sectors in order to substitute for the fall
in income, which tend to be the formal sector or the self-employment sector (Maloney
1998). However, given household roles, if the individual is also responsible for
homecare, he/she may prefer the flexibility of contract work or of the lower paying
informal wage sector. On the other hand, if the fall in income is not realized but a person
still enters the labor force to act as insurance for potential decreases in income, entry to
the lower paying  jobs may be sufficient and it is less likely that homecare will be
sacrificed for formal sector labor.
Second, in households without two responsible adults present such that each
the extent of assuming  that labor force participation decisions take the behavior of other household
members as exogenous and that some of each individual's labor earnings are shared by the household.
5 Maloney (1998) finds that adjustment downturns in Mexico occur primarily  through  wages  rather than
employment  due to the high costs that dismissals incur on fimns  (Marquez 1992).
6Although  the AWE is a theoretically sound idea, it has not been strongly supported by empirical evidence.
Heckman and MaCurdy (1982) and Lundberg (1985) find that there is an added worker effect for certain
groups of people, but it is very small. On the other hand, a different functional specification and more
restrictive parameters in an earlier paper by Heckman and MaCurdy (1980), and original work by Layard
(1980), and Maloney (1987, 1991) do not find any evidence of an added worker effect.  Gruber and Cullen
(1996) suggests that the absence of an AWE in the above studies is expected since the data are drawn from
universes where social insurance programs distort labor supply behavior.  All the countries used to study
the AWE offer  an  unemployment insurance program that  dampens the  need  for substitute labor and
decreases the likelihood that secondary workers will enter the labor force.  Mexico does not have such an
income support program.
7specializes in home or market work, the household head must play both roles.  In Mexico,
25% of households are headed by a single adult who must act as both primary
breadwinner and caregiver. In this case, the head would enter the informal sector in order
to take advantage of the flexible location and time parameters the sector often offers.
Other members in the household will impose constraints on the head's time.  The
female head or spouse of the head tends to be responsible for care of the house and
children, either doing the work herself or delegating tasks to other household members.
Children or non-head adults may be substitutes for household labor, though, allowing the
head/spouse to allocate time to the labor market. However, they may have the opposite
effect and increase demands  on the wife's home time if they depend on her for child
and/or elder care.
Household composition may also affect sectoral choice. If a woman needs to go to
work but her household duties also require a large time commitment, she may combine
the two by going into an informal sector  job.  Such employment offers time flexibility
since it is not subject to legally  mandated shift and work week laws, but it also offers
location flexibility since some types of informal work can be done in the home or in the
community. Women with young children are most likely to take advantage of these
employment arrangements.
Household  members also affect the amount of money that is earned and spent.
Non-head members may contribute to household income, thus supplementing the
earnings of the head. However, they also impose a cost on the household budget
constraint, thereby increasing the minimum level of income a household requires.
Taking all these factors together, it may be expected that labor force entry and
8sectoral allocation trends are based more on household roles than gender. Several
hypotheses will be tested. First, there are patterns that we expect to observe regardless of
the status of the economy: i) married women are less likely to enter work than are
women who do not have another breadwinner in the household, suggesting that
household role matters more than sex in determining  labor force participation; ii) women
who head households similar to those of men have labor force entry patterns that are
similar to men, i.e. breadwinners  behave similarly regardless of sex; and iii) if gender
discrimination is the primary explanation for low female labor force participation or
higher female informal sector participation,  then labor force entry rates for all women
should be lower than men's, and rates in the informal sector should be higher than men's.
Second, a recessionary period will induce changes in labor force behavior such
that: i) wives are more likely to enter the labor force when there is an expected or real
shock to household income, but all other types of household heads should be less likely to
enter since their non-work status in period one implies sources of non-labor income, and
ii) wives are more likely to enter the flexible informal sector if there are children in the
household, but the primary breadwinners should be unaffected by household structure,
regardless of sex.
III. Data, Terminology, and an Historical Context
3.1  Sampling
The national Urban Employment Survey (ENEU) collected by the Mexican
Statistical Institute (INEGI) for the period 1987-1993 is used. It is arranged such that  an
observation is selected into the data set, surveyed every three months, and then dropped
from the sample after the fifth interview, thereby following individuals and their
9households over 15 months. The seven years consist of 24 cohorts with approximately
3000 couple-headed households, 600 households headed by single mothers, 80 headed by
unmarried women without children, and 200 headed by unmarried men without children,
per cohort, where the head is in the age range 14-70. Each household member older than
age 11 is surveyed about demographics,  job search, characteristics of the job, current
earnings, and reasons for labor force participation decisions.  For those younger than 12
years old, only age is recorded. Observations  within households can be matched to
identify changes in household behavior over the period.
Both labor force entry and sectoral allocation patterns of household heads who
were out of the labor force in period one 7 but in the labor force by period five are
considered. The term "in the labor force" (ILF) is defined in the traditional sense; i.e. the
individual is working or spent time searching for a job in the month prior to the survey.
Conversely, being out of the labor force (OLF) indicates that the person is neither
working nor actively searching for ajob.
The terminology for sectoral choice is more controversial  due to different
institutions, data availability, and theoretical biases regarding the existence of the
informal sector. 8 Five primary sectors are identified, based on characteristics  of the firms
and remuneration (Davila 1997): formal wage, informal wage, unpaid, self-employment,
and contract employment. The formal wage sector is defined as the set of jobs in firms
7 An individual may be selected into the data set in any of the four periods each year, so "period 1" for
cohort x is the first period that the cohort is selected into the survey. It is not a chronological  term referring
to the first period of a calendar year.
Traditional theories suggest that the presence of various sectors are characteristic of a segmented labor
market where institutional  barriers such as minimum wage laws (Stiglitz 1986),  unions, or employment
quotas force up labor costs and lead to an excess supply of labor at the offered wage. An alternative
hypothesis (Hart 1972) does not view the labor markets as segmented but instead recognizes that they are
well integrated and the different sectors reveal the heterogeneity of work preferences of the labor force.
10with more than six employees that offer wages/salaries  and federally mandated benefits
to their workers. The informal wage sector is composed of those jobs in firms with fewer
than six employees that pay wages or salaries but do not pay benefits. Unpaid sector  jobs
are those that do not provide any remuneration or benefits to the workers. The self-
employment sector is comprised of those firms that do not offer benefits and have fewer
than six employees, one of whom is the owner. Contract workers are those who are
piece-workers or have a short-term contract with a termination date.  Table 1 summarizes
the labor force participation and sector of participation terms.
3.2  Mean values
Table 2 compares  the mean values for each type of household head. On average,
wives are younger than single mothers. Unmarried men and women without children
show a relatively uniform age distribution, indicating that individuals at all ages are fairly
equally represented, but young women are slightly over-represented. Husband's ages are
distributed similarly  to the wives, but they are, on average, three years older. Women
without husbands or children tend to be the best educated and single mothers have the
fewest years of education. This reflects the age distribution, since more recent
generations have higher mean education levels.
Approximately  94% of couples are married, while 83% of single mothers were
married (10% divorced, 21% separated, 52% widowed), 12% of women without children
were in a union (8% widowed), and 40% of single men were married (6% divorced, 1  1%
separated, 23% widowed). Over the period, 0.14% of couples in a consensual union
became married and 0.11% split up.  Nearly 1.1% (1.2%) of single mothers wed (or
11joined a consensual union) as did 1.8% of women without children, while no single men
either married or entered a consensual  union.
Married couples tend to have more children at all age groups and fewer non-spouse
adults than do households headed by unmarried individuals. In the aggregate,  those
without spouses do add children to the household over the five periods.
3.3  The Mexican economy
From 1987-1993,  the Mexican economy moved through a trough-to-trough  period
in the business cycle. The 1982 debt moratorium  and subsequent austerity measures and
debt renegotiations lead to negative growth in the early 1980s and very slow growth
through the mid-1980s (Lustig 1992). By the end of 1986, loans, foreign investment,
financial deregulation, privatization,  and cuts in public expenditure led to a 1988-1990
boom period (Ros 1996). However, by the early 1990s, with the recession in the US and
the overvalued exchange rate, the economy slowed once again (Graph 1).
IV.  Labor force participation over the business cycle
4.1  Participation in the laborforce and by sector: levels
A traditional breakdown by sex obscures the importance of household role and
intra-gender  heterogeneity in both labor force participation and sectoral choice. Table 39
shows that over 70% of women and 6% of men are out of the labor force. However,
while 76% of wives are out of the labor force, only half of the single mothers in the
9 Using  all  24 cohorts,  the  sample  consists  of 77,192  couple-headed  households,  13,787  households  headed
by unmarried women with children, 1,997  households headed by unmarried women without children, and
4,021 households  with unmarried men as the head.
12sample and 30% of single women without children are neither working nor looking for
jobs.  This compares with 8% of husbands and 13% of single men. Thus, wives, 92% of
whom have working husbands, drive the female participation statistic and obscure the
fact that a high percentage of women without spouses are in the labor force. In fact, the
participation patterns of women without spouses or children are more similar to those of
men with the same household structure (no spouse, no children) than they are to women
who have differently structured households.
Sectoral allocation also divides more cleanly along household roles rather than
biological lines, as shown by Table 4.  Due to the large number of wives out of the labor
force, we will only consider the economically  active population (EAP).1 0 Over 13% of
the working wives are in unpaid  jobs, while less than 0.65% of all other groups are. In
fact, all unmarried people, whether male or female, have approximately the same level of
participation in the unpaid sector. This difference occurs because all unpaid wives have
another source of labor income: the breadwinner (husband), but for those who are the
primary earners in their households, unpaid employment does not seem to be an option,
even if they are female.
Informal paid jobs are often cited as employing the most vulnerable workers,
usually single mothers (Standing 1989). However, single mothers, who are the primary
breadwinners of the family, have informal sector attachment patterns that are closer to
men with similar economic responsibilities. While 34.9% of single mothers are self-
employed, 30% of men, who are also the primary breadwinners, are self-employed  but
only 24% of wives, those without primary income generating  responsibilities, are in this
10  The EAP sample sizes are 18,766  wives, 7,066 single mothers, 1,383  unmarried women without children,
72,496 husbands,  and 3,497 men without spouses.
13sector. Furthermore, informal wage employment  of single mothers (13.8%) is more
similar to unmarried individuals (8.5%) than wives (7.8%). Finally, the probability of
contract work is nearly equal for all groups except husbands, who are more likely to hold
these quasi-self-employed/  employee positions.
Low risk, high compensation formal sector  jobs'  1 are assumed to be the most
favorable and therefore the sector where gender discrimination  is thought to be the
highest, but it is primarily populated by single women, conditional on the size of the
sample. Although male household heads (51.6%) outnumber female formal wage
employment (46.9%), over 62% of unmarried, childless women work in large firms and
collect benefits while 47% of unmarried men and 51% of husbands hold such jobs.
Employers cite a preference for women without spouses or children since their household
responsibilities do not conflict with their work and they are more compliant and
responsible than are men, who are prone to alcoholism and absenteeism (Chant 1991).
Single women with children and wives, the most likely to have inflexible household
responsibilities, are less likely to be in the formal sector (43.7% and 47%), respectively.' 2
Thus, even though employers admit that they discriminate against men, their primary
explanation for hiring unmarried women is an absence of household responsibility, i.e.
they openly acknowledge discrimination based on household role.
l The benefits associated with formal sector jobs are estimated to increase the wage bill by 80% (Marquez
1984).
144.2  Transition Patterns over the Business Cycle
Studying transition patterns and trends may reveal 1) how households cope with
business cycle shocks and 2) the importance of household role in that decision. Two
cohorts are drawn from the 24 cohort sample to compare labor force entry behavior in a
peak and a trough period. The sample for the expansionary  period is composed of
individuals who were OLF in the third quarter of 198913  and for the contractionary period
from the third quarter of 1992.14  The sample sizes of men and women without spouses or
children were too small to include in the analysis.
Table 5 summarizes the conditional probabilities (multiplied by 100) of
attachment to state k by period 5 given that the individual was OLF in period 1. The top
entry in each cell is the transition of between OLF and state k between periods 1989:3
and 1990:3 and the bottom entry is the transition between OLF and state k between
1992:3 and 1993:3. Letting Pj represent the count of individuals OLF in period 1 and Pjk
represent the count of individuals who moved from OLF to sector k by period 5, the
conditional probability is calculated as:
Pr (sector k in period 5 1  OLF in period 1)= Pjk/ Pi  (1)
Wives demonstrate an AWE and a propensity for self-employment when the
economy is deteriorating, while single mothers and husbands do not.  Table 5 shows that
wives are less likely to remain OLF during bad economic times: less than 10% enter in
12 The near equality of these statistics do not necessarily indicate that there is not discrimination against
women in formal employment since a higher percentage may prefer formal sector jobs but are
discriminated against in the hiring process so they turn to OLF status.
13 Sample size of 2410 wives, 200 husbands, and 261 unmarried mothers.
14 Sample size of 2347, 192, and 265 of wives, husbands, and single mothers, respectively.
15expansions, but 13.2%  enter in recessions. Although single mothers seem to show the
same pattern, the difference in proportions is not significant.
Of the states of entry, wives are more likely to be unemployed, but single mothers
and husbands are not.  Perhaps this is because single mothers and husbands have to work
but wives, often those who will act as insurance, may spend more time searching for jobs,
since their labor income crisis has not yet been realized. Also, wives are more likely to
start their own small firms when the economy gets bad whereas others are not.  The
wives may have the resources to undertake the project using their husbands' earnings and
eventually generate the extra income. Husbands, on the other hand, usually do not have
another primary source of income, 15 so they may be forced to look elsewhere for less
costly means of employment. Interestingly, single mothers do not increase the likelihood
of self-employment in crisis, although this is assumed to be the refuge of the most
vulnerable groups. Instead, salary work (though the difference in proportions is not
significant) seems to be the sector of entry.
V. Methodology
The decision to enter the labor force is distinct from the choice of sector. Ideally
sector choice would be estimated conditional on labor force entry, but given the current
technology, this is not possible. 16 Instead, a labor force participation decision model is
estimated and then, keeping in mind those who sorted themselves into the labor force, a
15 Only 15% of non-working  husbands have working wives.
16 The error terms from a labor force entry model have a discrete rather than a normal or a logistic
distribution.  Thus, we would have to estimate a non-parametric sectoral choice model, a technology that is
still in the experimental  phase.
16sectoral choice model is estimated.
The variables of interest are whether or not the head enters the labor force when 1)
economic conditions deteriorate, 2) other household members lose their jobs, 3)
household labor income falls, and 4) household composition changes. To identify
whether or not the entry probabilities differ along household roles or gender lines, each
household role/gender group is analyzed separately. Following a methodology used by
Valletta (1993) and Maloney (1998), the data are treated as a cross-section but transition
dummies and dummies for those variables that change over the five periods are included.
5.1  Labor=force  participation - logit
The sample consists of all 24 cohorts.1 7 The entry decision is estimated as a logit
model, corrected for heteroscedasticity (Fernandez 1998),  that estimates the probability
of labor force entry by period 5 conditional on being out of the labor force in period 1:
Pr (Polf >_ilf)  = A[a + X P1I  + (lNEMP)  12  +  (INVOLF)  13 + (HHINV) P4
+ (FALLHHY) P5  + (FALLHIO)  16 + (FALLH25) 07  +  (2)
(FALLH50) 18 + (FALLH75) P1  + (FALLHIOO)  13i  + El
where A is the logistic distribution, X is a vector of control variables, UNEMP is the
unemployment  rate in each cohort's first period, INVOLF is a dummy that takes a value
of 1 if the husband (wife) involuntarily left his (her) last job over the five periods, and
HHINV is the number of workers in the household (less the husband/wife) who lost their
jobs between periods 1 and 5. FALLHHY is the change in family labor income between
periods 1 and 5, net of the head's earnings and the dummies FALLH10, FALLH25,
17FALLH50, FALLH75, and FALLH100  take a value of 1 if the fall in household labor
income is in the range 1-9%, 10-24%,  25-49%, 50-74%, and 75-100%, respectively, and
0 otherwise.
There are three specifications of equation (2). In the first model, the change in
income variables (those associated with ,B5  - PI  o) are dropped so we may focus on the
impact of unexpected shocks to household employment. However, involuntary  job losses
may not accurately capture an increased need for household income for two reasons.
First, labor market in Latin American may adjust through wages, so a decrease in real
wages rather than employment is more likely (Marquez 1994). Secondly, household
members are heterogeneous and thus have different earnings potential so entry and exit
by multiple household members probably affects household income. Thus, Model 2 tests
the response of household heads to a fall in total household labor income by including
the control variables (X), the unemployment  rate (UNEMP), and the change in household
income variable (FALLHHY). To account for non-linearities in the continuous variable
FALLHHY, the third model drops all variables except the control variables, the
unemployment  rate, and the five dummies that identify the magnitude of the income fall
to identify the labor supply responses  to different levels of household labor income
decreases. If an added worker effect exists, we expect a positive coefficient on each of
the independent  variables that are not included in vector X.
The control variables include characteristics that would influence the reservation
wage and expected market wage through household structure, labor demand variables,
and productivity indicators. Each are described and their reasons for inclusion are stated
17 The sample size is 53,466  wives, 4,193 husbands, 6,373 single mothers, 448 unmarried women without
children, and 542 unmarried men.
18in Table 6.
5.2  Sector of participation -multinomial logit
To identify which sector workers enter, only those household heads who were OLF
in period one and became employed by period five are included in the sample (12,223
wives, 1,064 husbands, and 801 single mothers). The sample size of unmarried
individuals without children was not large enough to estimate sectoral choice. A
multinomial logit framework is employed where the sector of exit may be formal wage,
informal wage, self-employment,  or sub-contracting. 18 The same independent variables as
above will be used.
VI.  Estimation results
6.1  Labor Force Participation
The following  estimation identifies the characteristics of labor force entrants. Entry
patterns are substantially  different among the three groups. In particular, wives tend to
act as secondary labor, entering as a substitute to household labor or as insurance.
Husbands, on the other hand, are very unresponsive to changes in household employment
or labor income. They probably have other income sources, since they enjoy the luxury
of not working in period one. Single mothers fall between these two extremes, perhaps
demonstrating  the role of both caregiver and breadwinner. Unmarried individuals
without children do not show identifiable patterns. Estimates of the shock variables are
presented in Table 7, those of household structure are in table 8 and demographic, labor
18 Unpaid and firm owners were dropped due to the small sample size in each job type.
19demand, and search variables are in table 9.
6.1.1.  Labor force entry in response to economic shocks
Wives most strongly demonstrate  an added worker effect, both as a form of
insurance and as a source of emergency income. When the unemployment rate is higher,
they are more likely to enter the labor force.  19 Furthermore, if their husbands
unexpectedly lose the job held in period 1, wives are likely to enter, but they do not
respond to sudden job losses of other household members. The change in household
income explains this pattern. Models 2 and 3 show that a wife begins working if
household labor income falls by 25% or more. Since husbands contribute, on average,
75% of household labor income, the wives are substituting their labor earnings for a fall
in household income, not for a change in LFP status by a particular family member.
Husbands are nearly unresponsive to economic shocks. They do not enter the
labor market when the unemployment  rate increases, nor do they respond to an
unexpected  job loss by anyone in the household. Only when labor income falls by 75%
or more do they look for work.
Single mothers are more responsive to shocks than husbands are, but less than
wives are, perhaps due to being both the breadwinner and the caregiver. If there are
multiple head adults in the household, home and market tasks are divided among them.
Wives have the most "non-market" time to offer in times of crises. The fact that they are
'9  In  another  specification  of  the  model,  a variable  was  included  to measure  the  change  in the
unemployment  rate  between  period  I and  period  5. This  variable  was  positive  and  significant  in all  cases
and  did  not  appear  to be correlated  with  any  other  independent  variables  in  the  original  specification.  We
do  not  include  this  specification  in  the  discussion,  though,  since  inclusion  of  the  change  in the
unemployment  rate  variable  necessitates  dropping  the  last  four  cohorts  for  which  we  do  not  have
unemployment  rate  data  of their  respective  fifth  periods.  Although  we  could  run  the  analysis  with  only
twenty  cohorts,  we  would  face  sample  size  problems  with  some  of the  household  variables.
20not working in period 1 does not imply that their family relies on a source of non-labor
income. Instead, 92% of wives have working husbands. Husbands, on the other hand,
tend to work. If they are not working, they probably have a source of non-labor income
(only 15% of non-working husbands have working wives), in addition to some household
labor income earned by non-heads. Thus, in households where most income comes from
labor, even a small shock to labor income will lead to a higher likelihood of entry than in
households where a high percent of income comes from other sources. Only very large
income shocks in these households lead to entry by the head.  Single mothers fall
between the two. They do not have another primary source of labor income, as wives do,
so they probably get much of their household income through non-labor sources and
wages of other household members. On the other hand, they are more likely to be OLF
than are husbands so more of them are potential labor force entrants. Many of them can
enter and will enter if there is a need.
Household heads without spouses or children do not respond to the state of the
economy, shocks to household labor, or shocks to household income. Since labor force
participation rates among these groups are high, we would not expect the few who are
OLF to enter the labor force under the risk of labor-income shock. Furthermore, they are
probably the most dependent on their own earnings ability. Since, by definition, they are
not working in period 1, they must have other sources of non-labor income (pensions,
financial instruments, rents), so a labor-income shock will not affect them. Also, if they
are living in communal (not familial) arrangements,  they are likely to be self-sufficient
and thus not responsive to earnings of roommates.
These results suggest that wives are the most responsive to labor-income shocks,
21single mothers are less so, and women without families are the least, demonstrating high
heterogeneity among women. However, single mothers behave somewhat like husbands
and single women do not differ from single men, so we may postulate that sex matters
less than does household role in labor supply decisions. It is not the fact of being a
woman that leads to entry by wives, but rather the fact of having to substitute for the
primary breadwinner that leads to her entry.
6.1.2 Household
The relevance of household structure is tested directly by considering the
influence that children or other adults have on labor force entry, controlling for economic
shocks. Household structure is a black box that is often used to explain women's, and to
a lesser extent men's (Nakamura and Nakamura 1992) labor force participation decisions.
In particular, lower female participation is tied to the presence of young children, but
higher participation is explained by the presence of daughters  or other adult females in
the household that can perform the household tasks. These trends appear in wives' labor
force participation patterns, but not in those of single mothers and husbands. The sign
and significance level of the household structure variables are listed in Table 8.
Constraints to labor force entrv
The presence of young children (age 1-5)  20 discourages a wife's entry into the
20 The  newborn  variable  may  be endogenous  since  the  decision  to bear  a child  and  the  labor  force
participation  decision  may  be realizations  of the  same  factors.  If  a woman  has  low  work  potential,  the
opportunity  cost  of  childbearing  is low  so  a lower  propensity  to enter  the  labor  market  may  exist  even  if a
child  is not  born. Regardless  of  whether  or  not  the  child  represents  a time  constraint  or low  earnings
potential,  his/her  presence  does  decrease  the  likelihood  of  labor  force  entrance  for  wives.  Existing  children
are  exogenous  parameters  so  we  do  not  need  to be concerned  with  a biased  estimator.
22labor force as does an increase in the number of young children in her household via
childbirth, adoption, or caring for someone  else's child. On the other hand, the number of
school aged children (6-11) is not correlated with a lower likelihood of labor force
participation.  Perhaps school serves as daycare for these children so they no longer
impede the wives' labor force entry.
Husbands have opposite patterns, though, as they are more likely to enter when a
young child is present.  Since  they tend to be the primary breadwinner  with few caregiver
responsibilities, they must generate  the resources that capital-intensive  children impose
on the household (Nakamura and Nakamura 1992). They are not responsive to the
presence of school-aged children, either.
The breadwinner role seems to conflict with the caregiving role for single mothers
since their labor force entry is neutral to the presence of children. On the one hand, the
income needs of the family may exceed the opportunity cost of staying home to care for
the children so we may expect these women to enter the labor force when there are more
young children in the household. On the other hand, young children cannot simply be
left alone so they may impede labor force entry. However, it is likely that when single
mothers need to work, a need that is somewhat independent of the marginal children in
the household, they find other childcare arrangements. These arrangements  are not
optimal alternatives, though, since married women do not use them, but they do allow
labor force entry by women who need to work.
Aids to labor force participation
Teenaged girls seem to alleviate wives of their home responsibilities and allow
23labor force entry but teenage boys and other female adults in the household impede entry.
The presence of a teenage daughter does increase the probability  that the wife enters paid
market work. These girls probably substitute for the primary caregiver' s labor thereby
lowering the reservation wage of work. Older sons and adult women have the opposite
influence as their presence decreases the likelihood of married mother's labor force entry.
This may be due to a higher opportunity cost of market work as teenage boys require
more care. Alternatively (and more probably), these boys and the adult women may
substitute for the wives in the labor force.
Conversely,  the presence of teenagers or other young adults in the household does
not induce single mothers or husbands to enter. Since the household heads are ultimately
responsible for the economic well-being of the household, they are more sensitive to
economic needs, and remain little constrained or aided by other potential labor market
substitutes or homecare givers.
A change in marital status is a very important influence on labor force entry for
wives and single mothers since it alters their roles.  Married women are less likely to go
to work than are those who are in a consensual union, possibly because the latter have
greater risk for separation so they are more willing to enter the labor market to invest in
themselves in preparation for a breakdown of the household. Women who split from the
couple arrangement (divorce, separate, widow, break the consensual union) in the five
periods are more likely to enter the labor force as they become responsible for generating
the income to support themselves. Conversely, single mothers who either marry or enter
a union are less likely to enter the labor force. Marital status does not affect husband's
work decisions and a change in status does not significantly explain labor force entry by
24those without children or by those who were husbands in period 1.
In summary, household structure does not constrain labor force entry by single
mothers or husbands, but it is highly influential in wives entry. If single mothers enter
the labor force, they do so because they must work. They cannot be and are not
constrained by their role as caregiver.
6.2  Sectoral Choice
Traditional development  theory cites the purposes of the informal sector as an
employer of last resort (Thomas 1992). If, indeed, it is a source of jobs when economic
times are difficult, we would expect the probability of exit to self-employment, informal
wage jobs, and contract work to increase relative to formal sector  jobs if household
employment or income fall.  However, the sector of entry is also subject to household
structure. If the wife needs to work, she is likely to choose a flexible job, such as
informal wage or contract work over the more restrictive formal sector. Single mothers
and husbands, on the other hand, are likely to go to the highest paying sectors, formal
wage or self-employment, rather than informal wage employment, that give less
flexibility for homecare activities. The estimated coefficients of the variables for the
probability of exit to the formal sector over state k are given in  Tables 10-12 (shock
variables, household structure, and others, respectively) and the sign on the coefficient
indicates if the probability of exit to formal is higher (>O)  than exit to sector k and vice-
versa, unless otherwise noted.2'  The sectoral choice decision is empirically examined  for
21 The coefficient estimates of multinomial logit estimates are difficult to interpret. However, the relative
risk ratios allow us to construct ratios such that if the ratio on a variable x for sector j over sector k is larger
than 1,  then as x increases, the likelihood of exit to sector j relative to sector k is increasing. This may occur
25wives, husbands, and single mothers.
6.2.1  Laborforce  entry in response to economic shocks
Wives that enter the labor force select sector based on household need. As the
unemployment rate increases, wives are more likely to enter any informal rather than
formal sector job.  Likewise, if her husband unexpectedly loses his job, the wife is more
likely to enter informal wage rather than formal wage employment. However, if the job
loss is associated with a large fall in household labor income, the wife is more likely to
enter the formal sector rather than any informal sector  job.  Thus, ajob loss associated
with a negative blow to income is answered by entry to the higher paying formal sector
(Maloney 1998), rather than the traditional "sponge" jobs, while the informal sector
seems to play an insurance role by employing wives when the risk of negative income
shocks increase.
Husbands are sector specific when their entry plays a insurance role, but not when
responding to falls in income. Similarly to wives, husbands who enter the labor force are
more likely to go into the informal wage sector or contract work compared to the formal
sector when the unemployment  rate increases. These findings directly support the
assumption that informal work arrangements are the employers of last resort when the
economy is tight.  However, the self-employment does not serve as a sponge sector,
supporting Maloney's (1998) findings that men's participation in the self-employment
sector is pro-cyclical. Furthermore,  husbands do not appear to select specific sectors in
response to negative employment or income shocks in the household. The exception is a
either due to an increase in the numerator (probability of exit to sectorj) or a decrease in the denominator
(decreased likelihood  of exit to sector k).
26higher likelihood of informal employment rather than the formal sector when household
earnings fall by less than 10%.
Single mothers are not more likely to enter any particular sector in response to
risk or to family earnings losses. This challenges  the assumption  that the informal sector
is an employer of last resort when the economy is tight since the probability of entry to
formal is not different from entry to any other sector for this group. Also, this
demonstrates that all women do not use the informal sector in the same way in response
to economic shocks. Instead, single mothers have patterns that are very distinct from
wives but more similar to husbands.
6.2.2 Household aids and impediments to laborforce entry
Only wives seem to take into consideration  household constraints when selecting
a sector, as shown in Table 11. Wives with children are more likely to enter any of the
informal sectors over formal wage. A higher likelihood  of informal employment is
probably due to the flexible work shifts and location of informal firms. Young adults in
the household increase the probability of wives' entry into self-employment rather than
wage jobs but older females increase the likelihood of formal sector employment. The
younger adults may provide unpaid labor to the wife's business while the older women
may provide unpaid labor to the wife's household job, thereby allowing her to divert her
time to the more structured formal sector.
Husbands and single mothers seem to use the other members of the household to
aid with market work rather than allowing them to impede their earnings responsibilities.
The primary breadwinners with young children do not select any particular sector.
27However, those with school aged or teenaged children have a propensity for contract
work rather than formal sector  jobs.  Since these children do not need the intensity of care
that their younger siblings do, they are possibly used as unpaid workers to help
supplement family income in a covert manner.
The difference between wives and single mothers again demonstrates the
importance of household roles. If a single mother must enter to support household
income, she does not have the option to select lower paying informal sector  jobs, i.e.
contract or informal wage work in order to care for children. Instead, she must have
other childcare arrangements.
The strength of the marital contract and its implication for future household roles
affect contemporaneous sectoral allocation patterns. Women who are married rather than
in a consensual union are more likely to participate in piece work than in any other sector
and more likely to enter self-employment than wage employment. A higher likelihood of
entry to non-wage employment may be due to the lower risk of economic hardship
provided by the rigid marital contract, an informal source of financing, and/or gender
roles. Those in a consensual union do not have a formal contract for a long-term
relationship  between the partners, so there is a higher risk that the union will end and the
woman will have to support herself. Thus, investment in the formal labor market is as
important as investment in the home market since there is a high probability that the
woman may need the labor market skills and connections. Also, a husband who is
married may be more likely to supply his wife with capital for piece work or self-
employment since he knows his wife's earnings and capital are more likely to benefit him
than if the couple were in a weaker consensual  union arrangement. Finally, the flexibility
28that piecework offers allows the woman to invest in her job as a housewife while
contributing to family income. If the partnership in period 1 ends by period 5, the ex-
partners who go to work are more likely to enter contract or informal wage work than
formal wage work. These women may have faced an unexpected shock, so their need to
rapidly generate income may have precluded them from an extended search to find paid
labor.  Furthermore,  their human capital may have eroded during the period of union. A
change in marital status does not induce entry into any particular sector by husbands or
single mothers.
VII.  Conclusions
An analysis of the data shows that labor patterns are more similar for those with
the same household roles than for those of the same sex, implying that it may be more
appropriate to take into consideration  household needs and resources than sex when
considering labor supply of the head. Gender does affect labor supply decisions, but our
results suggest that it has an indirect effect, entering through household role rather than
directly. Women who do not have spouses or children to care for behave more similarly
to men than they do to married women.  In fact, women without either a spouse or
children are more likely than any other group to be in the higher paying, inflexible formal
sector jobs, bringing into question whether or not employers discriminate based on sex or
on household structure. Married women, on the other hand, are secondary workers
whose labor supply is very contingent on household responsibilities.
From a policy perspective, it is not necessarily appropriate to use "women" as a
target group since they are a very heterogeneous group. Short-run interventions (that take
29constraints as given) should take info account that wives will enter the labor force for
short periods when the risk of a negative shock (to act as insurance) or an actual fall in
household income occurs (substitute labor), but they are not permanently in the labor
force. 22 Thus, in the short run, they are in need of unemployment insurance programs
and job matching or short-run income generating  opportunities. Single mothers and
husbands, on the other hand, also enter in response to the shock, but less so, and single
women's and men's labor force entry is not subject to the economy. Programs that aid
household heads, whether male or female, should be directed toward employment that
will last beyond the economic shock.
The informal sector does play a role during economic downturns. In particular,
the lower paying informal sector  jobs, contract or informal wage employment are the
sector of choice when labor force entry is a response to an insurance need (for married
individuals). However, when there is a negative shock to household income, wives are
more likely to enter the higher paying formal or self-employment sectors. Thus,
individuals seem fairly able to enter any sector, but the sector of choice depends on the
immediate income needs of the household.
Household structure influences the labor force entry of wives, but not of single
mothers. Wives with young children are less likely to enter the labor force, and when
they do, they tend to go into the more flexible informal sector  jobs that allow them to
combine homecare and market work. Single mothers do not adjust either labor force
entry or sector of entry based on the presence of young children. Initially, this may be
interpreted as an absence of a need for childcare programs for single mothers. However,
30such a conclusion is premature. Single  mothers often do not have the option of selecting
lower paying informal wage or contract  jobs since if they begin working, they do so with
the intent of generating maximum income with minimum time inputs. Thus, they must
find other childcare arrangements. Such arrangements  are probably not optimal,  though,
since married women, who may either choose to care for their children themselves or
send them to these "alternative" arrangements,  tend to choose the homecare model,
indicating that the benefit of caring for the children herself outweighs that of holding a
job and hiring someone  else to care for the children.
22 Logit estimates of the probability of moving from ILF to OLF show that wives are more likely to exit the
labor force when the economy improves; i.e. when the unemployment rate falls.
31VIII.  Tables and Graphs
Table 1: Labor force and sectoral terminology
laborforce participation status
out of the labor force (OLF)  not employed and not looking for a job
in the labor force (ILF)  either wage or non-wage employed or looking for a job
unemployed  searched for a job for at least one hour in the previous
week
informal employment
unpaid  performed market work for at least one hour in the last
week without compensation
self-employed  either self-employed or owner of a firm with less than 6
employees  in  which  the  employees  do  not  collect
benefits
informal wage  salaried employee or shift worker in a firm with less than
6 employees and benefits are not collected
contract/piece  a "self-employed" worker paid by the piece or contracted
for a period of time or a quantity of output
formal employment
formal wage  salaried employee or shift worker in a firm with more
than 6 employees and/or collect benefits
fir3  owner  owner of a firm with more than six workers
32Table 2:  Average sample characteristics]
women  men
Wives  Single  unmarried, no  Husbands  unmarried
mothers  children
Demographics
Age  38.33  49.83  42.28  41.66  43.26
(11.04)  (11.2)  (14.93)  (11.7)  (14.87)
Education  5.93  4.66  6.82  5.94  5.67
(3.17)  (3.27)  (3.17)  (3.17)  (3.32)
Marry  0.0014  0.011  0.018  0.0014  0
(0.037)  (0.11)  (0.13)  (0.037)
Split  0.0011  0.0011
(0.033)  (0.033)
Consensual union  0.012  0.0052  0
(0.11)  (0.072)
Was married  0.83  0.12  0.4
(0.38)  (0.33)  (0.49)
Household
Add kid  0.074  0.034  0.064  0.074  0.0051
(0.26)  (0.18)  (0.25)  (0.26)  (0.071)
Less kid  0.015  0.024  ---  0.015  0.0037
(0.12)  (0.15)  (0.12)  (0.061)
Female age  0.34  0.55  0.46  0.34  0.52
(18-60)  (0.69)  (0.79)  (0.72)  (0.69)  (0.82)
Male age  0.35  0.54  0.21  0.35  0.39
(18-60)  (0.71)  (0.81)  (0.51)  (0.71)  (0.71)
Female age  0.022  0.04  0.11  0.022  0.1
(61+)  (0.18)  (0.2)  (0.33)  (0.18)  (0.31)
Male age  0.0071  0.0075  0.018  0.0071  0.012
(61+)  (0.084)  (0.086)  (0.14)  (0.084)  (0.11)
Newborn  0.086  0.01  0.00052  0.086  0.0002
(0.28)  (0.1)  (0.023)  (0.28)  (0.014)
Children  age  0.5  0.11  ---  0.5  0.014
1-5  (0.73)  (0.37)  (0.73)  (0.14)
Children  age  0.71  0.28  ---  0.71  0.057
6-11  (0.92)  (0.62)  (0.92)  (0.31)
Daughters  age  0.36  0.26  ---  0.36  0.069
12-17  (0.65)  (0.55)  (0.65)  (0.3)
Changein  0.0011  0.0011  ---  0.0011  0.0002
daughters  12-17  (0.035)  (0.035)  (0.035)  (0.014)
Sons age  0.38  0.27  ---  0.38  0.085
12-17  (0.67)  (0.57)  (0.67 )  (0.35)
Total adults in hh  2.71  2.14  1.8  2.71  2.03
(1.16)  (1.26)  (1.02)  (1.16)  (1.22)
istandard  errors in parentheses.
33Graph 1:  GDP Growth Rates
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Table  3:  ILF/OLF - all 24 cohorts (%)  ,
women  men
all  wives  single  single no  all  '  husbands  single
mothers  children
OLF  70.71 j  75.69  48.74  30.75  6.68 j  6.08  13.03
unemployed  0.84  0.69  1.47  2.0  1.59  1.52  2.19
n  90239  77192  13787  1997  80239 '  77192  4021
34Table 4:  Sectoral allocation - all cohorts (%)
women  men
all  wives  single  single no  all  husbands  single
mothers  children
unemployed  2.86  2.85  2.86  2.89  1.71  1.62  2.52
unpaid  9.21  13.01  0.6  0.65  0.25  0.23  0.46
informal s-e  26.36  23.72  34.86  21.19  30.33  30.01  31.31
informal salary  9.34  7.75  13.76  8.24  6.62  6.45  9.27
contract/piece  4.78  4.94  4.37  3.54  7.46  7.54  5.98
formal wage  46.92  47.06  42.74  62.84  51.61  51.73  48.73
firm owner  0.53  0.51  0.6  0.51  2.03  2.07  1.4
n  26386  18766  7066  1383  74627  72496  3497
35Table 5:  conditional probability of moving into sector k by period 5 for those who were
OLF in period 1 (in expansionary or contractionary phases)a
wives  single mothers  husbands
OLF  *90.21  85.82  67.5
86.8  81.89  69.79
unemployed  *0.25  0.38  7.5
1.02  4.91  8.33
unpaid  1.91  0.38  0.5
2.56  0  2.08
informal s-e  *3.15  8.43  13.5
4.47  7.55  8.85
informal salary  1.41  1.53  2.0
1.24  3.02  2.6
contract/piece  0.83  0.38  0.5
1.11  0.38  2.6
formal wage  2.24  3.07  8.0
2.68  1.89  5.2
firm owner  0  0  0.5
0.04  0  0.52
n  2410  261  200
2347  265  192
* The sample proportion between the two transitions within the cell is statistically  different from zero.
athe  probability of being in sector k in 1990:3 if the individual was OLF in 1989:3 is given as the top value
of each cell; the probability of being in sector k in 1993:3 if the individual  was OLF in 1992:3 is the bottom
value in each cell.
36Table 6: Explanatory variables used in labor force participation  equation
VARIABLE  RATIONALE FOR INCLUSION
Shock
Unemployment rate: male national unemployment  proxy for labor demand and labor
rate by quarter  force entry as insurance
fall in household income  decrease in reservation wage
fall household earnings:
* 0-9%
*  10 -24%  to consider the importance of the
* 25 -49%  magnitude of the fall in household
* 50 - 74%  income
*  75 - 100%
*spouse involuntarily OLF: dummy = 1 if  proxy for a fall in family
husband was ILF in period 1 but was forced out of  employment
his job by period 5
* number of workers in household involuntarily  proxy for a fall in family
OLF (less spouse)  employment
Demographics
age: reported age  proxy for experience (human capital
theory)
school: reported years of formal education  human capital theory
married- dummy =1 if married and = 0 if in a  balance of power in the household
consensual union  (Fleck 1983)
*separated:  dummy =1 changed from married or  fall in family income
consensual union to single between the periods
Household structure
young female adult: number of women in the  more adult females may substitute
household age 18-64  for female hh head in market or
house work
*change in number of young female adults  change in time constraints
old female adults: number of women in the  more older females may substitute
household age 65+  for the head wife in household work
OR incur costs on the head-wife's
time
young male adult: number of men in the  more adult males may substitute for
household age 18-64  female hh head in market work
*change in the number of young male adults  change in hh income constraints
old male adult: number of men in the household  more older males increase
age 65+  household expenses OR incur costs
on the head-wife's time
*newborn: (or wife) gave birth between periods 1  Additional constraint on time
and 5
children age 1-5: number of children in the  more young children limit time
household between the ages 1 and 5  available for market work
*change in young children: change in the number  Change in head wife's time
37of children age 1-5 in the household between  constraints
periods
children age 6-1  1: number of children in the  Change in head wife's time
household age 6-11  constraints
*change in school aged children: change in the  Change in head wife's time
number of children age 6-11 between periods  constraints
daughter age 12-17: number of girls in the  more older females may substitute
household age 12-17  for the mother in market or
household work
*change in daughters age 12-17
son age 12-17 household: number of boys in the  more older males increase
household age 12-17  household expenses, but they are
also potential market earners
*change in sons age 12-17
* additional child: dummy =1 if there are more  Additional constraint on head-wife's
own children in the household in period 5 thanl  time
fewer children: dummy =1 if there are fewer own  Less constraints on head-wife's time
children in the household in period 5 than 1
maid present: dummy =1 if a maid is present in  less constraints on the head-wife's
the household  time
number of adults in the hh  Substitution for market work
*change in number of adults in the hh  Change in potential substitution
Labor demand
Regional dummies  proxy for regional labor market
conditions
% LF female: calculated as the percentage of the  ease of labor market entry for
municipal level labor market that is female  women, crowding out of men
city size: calculated from the 1990 census data  proxy for the availability of jobs
Search resources
household income: level of household labor  proxy for either wealth or search
income in period 1  resources
spouse was s-e- dummy: 1 if husband was self-  the spouse has information about
employed in the last job  employment in a previous job,
decreasing current search costs
spouse was informal wage:dummy = 1 if husband  the spouse has information about
was an informal wage employee in the last job  employment in a previous job,
decreasing current search costs
spouse was formal wage: dummy = 1 if husband  the spouse has information about
was a formal wage employee in the last job  employment in a previous sector,
decreasing current search costs
spouse was contract: dummy = 1 if husband was a  the spouse has information about
contract worker in the last job  employment in a previous sector,
I decreasing current search costs
* a variable that measures  change  over the five periods
38Table 7:  Logit coefficient estimates of shock variables
l_________  women  men
Wife  single  unmarried  husbands  unmarried
mother  no kids  no kids
Model I:
unemployment rate  0.35**  0.26*  -0.17  0.15  0.14
(0.047)  (0.12)  (0.42)  (0.12)  (0.33)
others involuntarily  0.02  0.057  0.1  0.03  0.043
OLF  (0.025)  (0.05)  (0.19)  (0.5)  (0.15)
spouse involuntarily  0.41**  0.6
OLF  (0.13)  (0.58)
Model II:
unemployment rate  0.36**  0.27*  -0.18  0.15  0.15
(0.047)  (0.12)  (0.42)  0.12)  (0.33)
fall household  9.84x10-**  1.0 x 10**  7.32 x 10-0  4.58 x 10  7.83  x  io-
income  (4.07 x 10-7)  (2.22 x 10-6) (1.15 x 10-)  (1.33 x 10-6)  (8.0 x 10-6)
Model III:
unemployment rate  0.36**  0.26*  -0.18  0.16  0.12
(0.048)  (0.12)  (0.42)  (0.12)  (0.33)
fall household
income by:
1-9%  0.032  0.03  0.49  -0.59**  -0.19
(0.056)  (0.2)  (1.02)  (0.18)  (0.69)
10-24%  0.027  0.092  -0.029  -0.031  0.85
(0.05)  (0.17)  (0.77)  (0.15)  (0.61)
25-49%  0.16**  -0.04  0.048  -0.1  0.37
(0.046)  (0.18)  (0.69)  (0.15  )  (0.57)
50-74%  0.35**  0.57**  -0.23  0.17  0.79
l________________ l(0.058)  (0.22)  (1.28)  (0.19)  (0.64)
75-100%  0.28**  0.59**  0.11  0.32*  0.3
(0.056)  (0.15)  (0.86)  (0.13)  (0.63)
sample size  53463  6373  448  4193  542
** significant at the 1% level
* significant at the 5% level
--- variable is not, by definition, included in the sample
39Table  8:  logit estimates of demographic and household structure variables'
women  men
Wife  single  unmarried  husbands 1  unmarried
I mother  no kids  _  no kids
Marital status
married  -0.11 *  -0.021
(0.058)  (0.19)
separated  0.82**  --  2.18
(0.31)  (1.2)
marry  -0.68*  -0.65  --
(0.31)  (0.81)
consensual union  -1.0*  2  __  1.09
(0.41)  (0.81)
Children
newborn  -0.12*  -0.35  ---  -0.49
(0.055)  (0.34)  (0.46)
# children age 1-5  -0.093**  -0.9  0.46**
(0.023)  (0.12)  (0.14)
change  in#  -0.41**  -0.18  ---  -0.34
children  age  1-5  (0.15)  (0.46)  (0.45)
#children age 6-11  0.017  0.016  -0.16
(0.017)  (0.074)  (0.071)
change in #  -0.15  -0.29  ---  -0.003
children age 6-11  (0.15)  (0.34)  (0.32)
# daughters  age  0.069*  -0.04  ---  -0.068
12-17  (0.033)  (0.084)  (0.066)
change in #  0.28  1.2  ---  0.29
daughters age 12-  (0.37)  (1.45)  (0.67)
17
sons age 12-17  -0.0051  0.0052  ---  0.09
(0.031)  (0.081)  (0.064)
change in # sons  -0.35*  0.27  ---  0.027
age 12-17  (0.17)  (0.45)  (0.4)
# additional  -0.28**  -0.18  ---  0.12
children  (0.063)  (0.22)  (0.21)
# fewer children  0.33*  0.43  ---  -0.027
(0.12)  (0.23)  (0.27)
Non-head  adults
# females age 18-  -0.11**  -0.063  -0.099  0.073  -0.0017
64  (0.031)  (0.068)  (0.29)  (0.043)  (0.21)
change in#  0.087  0.85  ---  0.31  -
females  18-64  (0.3)  (1.14)  (0.54)
# males age 18-64  -0.14**  -0.19*  -0.24  0.057  -0.44
(0.029)  (0.074)  (0.39)  (0.043)  (0.27)
40change in # males  0.12  2.33  2  -0.21  2
age  18-64  (0.26)  (1.027)  (0.5)
# females  age 65+  0.086  0.11  ---  -0.23  -0.43
(0.1)  (0.23)  (0.25)  (0.61)
# males age 65+  0.056  -0.4  1.65  -0.21  0.32
l________________  (0.17)  (0.51)  (1.57)  (0.5)  (1.077)
The coefficient estimates were very similar  among models, and the significance levels were identical.
Thus, only the estimates from Model IV, the model with the best fit, are reported here.
2 Variable was dropped due to perfect predictability.
**  significant at the 1% level
* significant at the 5% level
--- variable is not, by definition, included in the sample
41Table 9:  other  variables  from the logit regressions
women  men
Wife  single mother  unmarried  husbands  unmarried
.I  Ino  kids  no kids
Demographics
Age  0.062**  -0.055  -0.018  -0.087  0.062
2______________  (0.011)  (0.031)  (0.062)  (0.044)  (0.051)
age2 -000096**  -0.00013  -0.00038  0.002  -0.0012*
(0.00013)  (0.0003)  (0.00068)  (0.004)  (0.00056)
years of education  0.0054  -0.014  0.036  -0.045**  -0.072*
(0.0054)  (0.012)  (0.042)  (0.012)  (0.036)
Wealth
household  labor  -2.7xlO-*  *  -6.67xl  0*  *  -2.69xl O6  -2.42x10 6 -1.01 xl O-
income in period  1  (4.69x10- 7)  (2.11x10-6)  (8.83x10-6)  (1.38x10-6)  (7.26x10-6)
Labor  demand
regional:
North  Central  -0.28**  0.24  -0.39  -0.059  0.72
(0.099)  (0.28)  (1.18)  (0.24)  (0.97)
Pacific  -0.19*  0.36  0.011  0.5*  1.46
(0.089)  (0.26)  (1.14)  (0.22)  (0.95)
Northeast  0.032  0.035  -0.5  0.3  0.66
(0.082)  (0.24)  (1.01)  (0.21)  (0.88)
North  -0.21**  -0.025  -0.69  0.22  0.84
(0.077)  (0.24)  (1.08)  (0.2)  (0.91)
North northeast  -0.16  0.032  -1.49  0.28  1.09
(0.091)  (0.27)  (1.25)  (0.23)  (0.97)
Central  -0.081  0.33  -0.68  0.59**  1.98*
(0.08)  (0.24)  (1.08)  (0.21)  (0.89)
Gulf Central  -0.13  0.097  -0.25  0.18  1.2
(0.098)  (0.27)  (1.21)  (0.25)  (0.99)
% local labor  0.48  3.97**  -0.66  -2.95*  -1.32
market female  (0.51)  (1.31)  (4.53)  (1.24)  (0.38)
city size  7.1 1xl  0-
9 -9.04x 10- 9 -1.5xl0-7 6.15x I 08 1  .36x I 0-
(1.2x10- 8)  (3.57x10- 8)  (1.56xlO- 7)  (3.17x10-8)  (1.28x10-7)
sample size  53463  6275  448  4193  542
log likelihood  -17018  -2439  -216  -2441  -303
Chi 2  770**  466**  54**  380**  65**
(d.o.f.)  (46)  (40)  (23)  (39)  (26)
The estimates are from Model 3, the Model that had the best fit.  The coefficient values for Models I and 11
differ slightly,  but the sign and magnitude of the coefficient estimates is very similar among the three
models
**  significant at the 1% level
* significant at the 5% level
42Table 10: multinomial logit estimates of shock variables
Wife  |  Single mother  Husband
Pr(exit to  self-  informal  contract/  self-  informal  contract/  self-  informal  contract/
formal):  employment  wage  piece work  employment  |  wage  piece work  employment  l  wage  piecework
Model I
unemploy-  -0.37**  -0.39**  -0.59**  0.19  -0.29  0.22  0.14  -0.75*  -1.04*
ment rate  (0.074)  (0.1)  (0.12)  (0.36)  (0.42)  (0.6)  (0.27)  (0.36)  (0.46)
others OLF  0.068  0.15  -0.0033  0.074  0.12  0.26  -0.022  0.27  -0.0035
involuntarily  (0.042)  (0.56)  (0.068)  (0.14)  (0.17)  (0.24)  (0.11)  (0.16)  0.2)
spouse OLF  -0.28  -0.65**  -0.35  ---  ---  ---  1.59
involuntarily  (0.19)  (0.23)  (0.31)  (0.9)
Model II
unemploy-  -0.37**  -0.39**  -0.59**  0.18  -0.29  0.22  0.12  -0.75*  1.12*
ment rate  (0 074)  (0.1)  (0.12)  (0.36)  (0.42)  (0.6)  (0.27)  (0.36)  0.46)
fall in other  1.19 x 10-(  3.43 x104**  4.24 xl O-**  2.87 x 10-'  2.57 x 10  3.23 x 10  -1.33 x 10'  3.39 x 10-  9.42 x 10-
household  (6.88 x 10-7)  (9.08 x 10-7)  (1.01  x 10-6)  (5.3 x 10-7)  (6.1 x 10-6)  (8.13 x 10-6)  (2.97 x 10-6)  (4.12  x 10-7)  (7.68 x 10-6)
income
Model III
unemploy-  -0.36**  |-0.39**  |0.58**  0.16  -0.32  0.14  0.13  | -0.74*  |1.053*
ment rate  (0.075)  (0.1)  (0.12)  (0.36)  (0.43)  (0.61)  (0.27)  l (0.36)  (0.46)
fall in
incom  e  by:  __  _  _  _  _  __  _  _  _  _  __  _  _  _  _  __  _  _  _  _
1 - b9%  0.051  0.085  0.18  -0.71  -1.3  -1.25  0.49  1.58*  0.28
(0.1)  (0.13)  (0.17)  (0.8)  (0.84)  (1.0)  (0.38)  (0.79)  (0.72)
10 - 24%  0.45**  0.26*  0.32*  0.56  0.36  0.98  0.25  -0.0027  0.16
(0.086)  (0.11)  (0.13)  (0.5)  (0.55)  (0.88)  (0.34)  (0.47)  (0.66)
25-49%  0.72**  0.71**  0.76**  0.61  0.085  0.72  -0.13  -0.2  -0.19
(0.068)  (0.092)  (0.11)  (0.58)  (0.62)  (0.94)  (0.34)  (0.48)  (0.58)
50-74%  0.67**  0.77*  0.93**  0.46  0.56  ---  0.025  0.094  -0.28
(0.074)  (0.11)  (0.13)  (0.57)  (0.7)  (0.42)  (0.59)  (0.78)
75-100%  0.16*  0.43**  0.55**  -0.065  -0.21  0.51  0.0017  0.2  0.79
(0.081)  (0.12)  (0.14)  (0.46)  (0.51)  (0.76)  (0.26)  (0.39)  (0.56)
sample size  12223  801  1064
**  significant  at the 1% level
* significant  at the 5% level
43Tablc 11: multinomial lo  it estimates of household structure variables
Wife  Single mother  Husband
Pr(exit to  self-  informal  contract!  self-  informal  contract/  self-  informal  contract/
formal over):  employment  Iwae  iece work  employment  wape  iece work  employment  wage  piece work
Marital status  I
married  -0.25**  -0.16  -0.64**  ---  ---  -0.12  0.058  0.44
(0.087)  (0.11)  (0.16)  (0.38)  (0.5)  (0.58)
separated  -0.83  -1.36  -1.47  ---2  --- 2
(0.59)  (0.77)  (0.78)  1
marry  - 1.06  0.72  2  ---  ---
(0.83)  (0.96)
Household
newborn  -0.18  -0.0096  -0.21  -0.14  -0.76  -0.047  0.36  0.64  0.37
(0.097)  (0.13)  (  (0.72)  (0.78)  (1.42)  (0.73)  (1.18)  (1.2)
#children age  -0.18**  -0.11I*  -0.28**  0.17  0.21  0.14  0.31  -0.2  -0.11
1-5  (0.039)  (0.052)  (0.06)  (0.27)  (0.32)  (0.47)  (0.22)  (0.27)  (0.3)
# children  age  -0.19**  -0.19**  -0.24**  -0.2  -0.44*  -0.72**  0.17  0.44*  -0.26
6-11  (0.028)  (0.037)  (0.046)  (0.18)  (0.2)  (0.25)  (0.13)  (0.21)  (0.19)
# daughters  -0.064  -0.12*  -0.065  -0.11  -0.5*  -0.32  0.12  0.21  -0.44*
age 12-17  (0.037)  (0.049)  (0.061)  (0.24)  (0.26)  (0.36)  (0.14)  (0.21)  (0.21)
# sons  age 12-  -0.099**  -0.15**  -0.15*  0.26  0.51*  -0.055  -0.057  -0.068  -0.093
17  (0.038)  (0.05)  (0.06)  (0.21)  (026  (0.31)  (0.13)  (0.18)  (0.23)
increase#  0.042  0.16  0.11  0.15  0.63  -0.49  0.41  0.21  -0.74
children  (0.1)  (0.14)  (0.17)  (0.64)  (0.83)  (0.88)  (0.4)  (  (0.54)
decrease#  -0.054  -0.18  0.73  0.54  - 1.25  -0.63  -1.01  -0.34
children  (0.21)  (0.26)  (0.48)  (0.54)  (1.16)  (0.67)  (0.78)  (1.19)
# females  age  -0.055  0.073  0.058  -0.1  0.33  -0.18  0.082  -0.0088  -0.0015
18-64  (0.046)  (0.065)  (0.079)  (0.22)  (0.26)  (0.34)  (0.097)  (0.13)  (0.18)
# males  age  -0.18**  -0.11  -0.043  0.23  0.23  1.5*  0.0098  0.18  0.22
18-64  (0.045)  (0.063)  (0.077)  (0.21)  (0.25)  (0.61)  (0.098)  (0.15)  (0.2)
# females  age  0.46**  0.22  0.083*  -0.31  0.074  -0.48  0.47  0.95  0.035
65+  (0.16)  (0.22)  (0.34)  (0.64)  (0.83)  (0.96)  (0.53)  (0.87)  (0.88)
# males age  -0.18  -0.058  0.24  0.19  -1.35  1.02
65+  (0.27)  (0.39)  (0.54)  (0.96)  (1.07)  (1.38)
changein#  -0.0015  0.49  -0.23  1.093  1.73  -2.02  0.81  *  0.89  0.25
adults  (0.19)  (0.28)  (0.31)  (1.17)  (1.22)  (1.37)  (0.37)  (0.53)  (0.63)
* the estimates  a e from Model  3, the Model  that had the best fit. The coefficient  values  for Models  I and 11  differ slightly,  bu  the sign  and magnitude  of the coefficient  estimates
is very similar  among  the three models.
2 dropped  because  the variable  predicted  failures  perfectly.
44Table 12: Multinomial logit coefficient estimates of remaining control variables
Wife  Single mother  Husbands
Pr(exit to formal  self-  informal  contract/  self-  |  informal  contract/  self-  informal  contract/
sector):  employment  wage  piece work  employment |  wage  -piece  employment  wage  piece work
Demographics
age  0.069**  0.13**  0.086**  -0.025  0.041  -0.13  0.013  -0.0019  0.069
(0.021)  (0.027)  (0.034)  (0.083)  (0.16)  (0.071)  (0.096)  (0.12)
age 2 -0.0013**  -0.0017**  -0.0013**  -0.00092  -0.00085  0.001  -0.00023  0.00011  -0.00071
(0.00026)  (0.0034)  (0.00042)  (0.00085)  (0.0017)  (0.0017)  (0.0007)  (0.00095)  (0.0012)
years of education  0.27**  0.35**  0.25**  -0.1**  0.3**  0.27**  0.098**  0.18**  0.051
(0.087)  (0.012)  (0.015)  (0.037)  (0.047)  (0.064)  (0.026)  (0.038)  (0.047)
Wealth
household  labor  2.82xl- 6**  3.19xO-° 6 **  T-1.32x10-  0.000014*  -0.000015*  -6.5x10-6  7.87x10-7  2.23xl10'  -6.66xl0-6
income  period 1  (6.34xl0- 7)  (1.07xl0-7  (1.1 1xO-6)  (5.92x10- 6)  (6.55x10- 6)  (8.1x I06)  (3.24xl0-6)  (5.15x10- 6)  (8.79x10- 6)
Labor demand
regional:
North Central  0.14  0.23  0.72**  0.86  0.071  2.36  0.44  -0.58  0.34
(0.15)  (0.23)  (0.28)  (0.78)  (1.13)  (1.31)  (0.52)  (0.76)  (0.89)
Pacific  0.044  0.1  0.27  -0.38  1.45  2.37*  -0.042  -0.22  0.089
(0.15)  (0.21)  (0.24)  (0.76)  (1.09)  (1.17)  (0.49)  (0.74)  (0.83)
Northeast  -0.15  -0.13  -0.35  0.73  0.85  1.33  -0.98  -1.3  -1.58
(0.13)  (0.19)  (0.2)  (0.7)  (1.0)  (1.04)  (0.53)  (0.75)  (0.79)
North  0.48**  -0.0061  0.62**  0.83  0.31  2.32*  0.076  -0.44  0.99
(0.12)  (0.18)  (0.2)  (0.68)  (1.01)  (1.05)  (0.43)  (0.67)  (0.78)
North northeast  0.00039  -0.3  0.41  0.37  0.49  2.83*  0.17  -0.054  0.9
- (0.15)  (0.21)  (0.25)  (0.76)  (1.12)  (1.32)  (0.49)  (0.77)  (0.92)
Central  -0.0038  -0.16  0.29  0.7  0.31  1.94  0.63  0.027  0.026
(0.13)  (0.19)  (0.22)  (0.69)  (1.01)  (1.083)  (0.44)  (0.69)  (0.76)
Gulf Central  -0.86**  -0.66**  0.31  -0.42  0.93  1.76  0.36  -0458  0.0097
(0.16)  (0.23)  (0.27)  (0.83)  (1.2)  (1.25)  (0.53)  (0.79)  (0.94)
% local labor  0.79  1.48  -4.37**  -4.2  -0.15  1.04  -1.54  1.71  -8.97
market female  (0.86)  (1.18)  (1.45)  (3.6)  (4.27)  (6.24)  (2.8)  (3.91)  (4.89)
city size  3.11xlO- 8 2.38xlO-  2.34xlO  1.28x-10  -8.73xlO-=  -6.58xlO-  2.0xlO-  -1.05xlO-7  1.41xlO-  i
_1.8xlo-_)  (2.68xl__-8)  (3.07xl0-8)  (l.Olxl0-7) (1.53x10-7)  (1.7xl 0-7)  (6.95xt0-8)  (1.03xl  0-7)  (  I 8xl  0-7)
Search
spouse  was self-  -0.57**  |0.29*  |0.15  - - -0.13  -0.21  -0.65
employed  (0.097)  1  (0.13)  (0.16)  (0.33)  (0.45)  (0.51)
45spouse was  -0.13  -0.4*  0.024  ---  0.09  0.23  -1.26
informal wage  (0.13)  (0.16)  (0.2)  (0.55)  (0.77)  (0.71)
spouse was  0.13  0.22  0.36*  ---  -0.0038  0.63  0.41
formal wage  (0.093)  (0.13)  (0.15)  (0.31)  (0.55)  (0.57)
spouse wage  -0.29*  -0.32*  -0.42  ---  ---  -1.0  -0.71  0.12
contract  (0.13)  (0.17)  (0.19)  _  (0.8)  (1.06)  (1.18)
sample size  12223  801  1054
log likelihood  -11804  -766.9  -1105.36
Chi  4151**  283**  175**
(d.o.f.)  (114)  (99)  (108)
the estimates  are from Model 3, the Model that  had the best fit. The coefficient  values  for Models I and 1I differ  slightly,  but the sign  and magnitude  of the coefficient  estimates  is
very similar  among  the three models.
**  significant at the 1%  level
*  significant  at the 5% level
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